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Abstract
In order to escape increasing political violence in the Middle East and
Africa, many refugees are fleeing by sea to seek asylum in Europe. As a result,
Europe has witnessed the highest influx of refugees since World War Two. European
Union member states have scrambled for a solution, seemingly unable to form a
collective response. The reemergence of nationalism amid the arrival of thousands of
refugees not only clouds Europe’s moral compass, but also weakens the EU and its
founding principles. In an effort to contribute to the protection of refugees and the EU
and its values, this thesis aims to discover the factors inhibiting a collective European
response to the refugee crisis.
I start by broadly explaining the crisis - highlighting main causes, routes into
Europe, tragedies at sea, and past European efforts. Next, I elaborate on methodologies
used during my fieldwork in Italy where I interviewed human rights professionals and
refugees. The literature review uses notable theories such as Huntington’s “Clash of
Civilizations” to explain the interaction between Europe and the arrival of non-European
refugees. The data analysis features both qualitative and quantitative data collected from
my fieldwork, highlighting demographic factors and economic benefits of migration in
Europe. My findings indicate that the EU asylum system is counter-productive because it
fails to address legal channels for refugees outside of Europe to seek asylum, and forces
peripheral EU states to absorb majority of refugees on their own. I attribute the rise of
nationalism to historical undertones and the paranoid preservation of cultural identity
amongst relatively homogenous states. Finally, I end this paper with a list of policy
recommendations that I believe can help protect both refugees and the EU.
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1.0 Introduction
Research Question
There are currently over sixty million displaced refugees worldwide - the
highest number ever recorded (UNHCR, “Worldwide displacement”, June 2015). Many
of these refugees are in protracted situations, displaced from previous or on going
conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. In 2011, the Arab Spring, a series of antigovernment demonstrations in the Middle East, led to a violent power vacuum in the
region that sparked several sectarian wars. This was particularly the case in Syria, where
a civil war had broken out between the Syrian regime, various rebel factions, and
extremist organizations (such as the Islamic State). The war in Syria has been the single
largest driver of refugees in the world, leaving over four million Syrians displaced
outside of Syria. The majority of displaced Syrians have fled to neighboring countries
such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.
As the war worsens, more Syrians are continuing to flee the country.
International organizations, such as the UNHCR were ill prepared for such a massive
influx. The strain in resources for Syrian refugees in the region has left many in
deplorable living conditions. To make matters even worse, refugees in many Arab host
states do not have the same rights as citizens, preventing them from becoming selfsufficient and living full, dignified lives. This is a dilemma that refugees around the
world typically deal with, however the case of Syria has exacerbated the global refugee
crisis and intensified the irregular migration flow into Europe.
By the summer of 2015, Europe witnessed the highest influx of refugees since
World War Two. The majority of these refugees pay human traffickers, who smuggle
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them on unseaworthy vessels across the Mediterranean, which have led to thousands of
deaths at sea. This influx exposed critical flaws in the European Union’s asylum system
known as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The goal of the CEAS is to
foster a collective European approach to asylum seekers in the EU but its policies; unable
properly to deal with the influx, has put many EU states at odds. At a time when a
collective European response is desperately needed, EU member states have taken
varying approaches to the refugee crisis as contradictory political strains have emerged.
Some states, such as Germany have responded with the EU’s liberal values in mind,
while others, such as Hungary, have resorted to right-wing nationalism, responding in
ways that openly defy the EU and international law.
In an effort to contribute to scholarship of how to improve the protection of
refugees and ensure EU stability, this thesis aims to answer the following question- what
factors prevent the EU from forming a collective refugee response? This paper will
examine the social, political, historical, and demographic conditions of nationalist and
liberal European states to explain the varying refugee approaches and policies within the
EU.
The European Union- It’s Purpose and Structure
The aftermath of World War Two devastated much of Europe. Following the war,
many European nations asserted that if they integrated their economies, they would be
less likely to engage in war again. In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman
proposed the idea of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that would "make
war not only unthinkable but materially impossible" (The Schuman Declaration, May
1950). One year later, the treaty of Paris realized Schuman’s proposal and aimed to unite
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Europe by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC formed a
common set of economic policies that facilitated trade amongst member states. Over the
years, the community expanded and eventually laid the foundation for greater
cooperation amongst European nations. By 1993, the ECSC had evolved and was
renamed the European Union (EU).
The EU, in its simplest terms, is a political and economic partnership between
twenty-eight European countries. Building off the mandate of the ECSC, the goal of the
EU is to foster cohesion, security, and prosperity in Europe. Its founding document, the
Maastricht Treaty places a strong emphasis on human rights, democracy, and European
solidarity. One of the biggest strengths of the EU is that its members share a single
market that allows the free movement of capital, goods, services and people within the
union. The majority of its member states also share a single currency, the Euro. These
shared policies make the EU a single region under a supranational organization.
The EU is compromised of various supranational institutions. These institutions
help facilitate national and international interests and establish a common set of policies.
The most powerful institution is the European Commission. The Commission is made up
of one representative per member state and a president, each of whom are elected every
five years. The twenty-eight EU commissioners are responsible for suggesting new laws
and ensuring that member states are practicing them. Two other institutions- the
Parliament (nationally elected members of parliament) and the Council of the EU (state
ministers) vote on the legislation proposed by the Commission. Parliament represents the
interests of EU citizens while the Commission represents the interests of Europe as a
whole (Europa.eu).
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Although the EU can be regarded as a modern-day political breakthrough, it is still
very much an unproven experiment. For years, the EU has prospered because national
governments have been willing to sacrifice part of their sovereignty for the betterment of
Europe. That sacrifice has been rewarded with full inclusion in the European community
and all the benefits that come with it. Now, an unprecedented influx of refugees entering
Europe poses a new threat to the EU. Many members have responded by prioritizing
national interests such as cultural identity over European solidarity. As the EU fumbles
on generating a collective response, serious questions are being raised over the EU
system and its future. Is the EU simply an economic union, or is it something more? The
crisis presents Europe with a historic opportunity to define itself under the values it was
built on which are now being challenged.
Defining a Refugee
The Legal Definition
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees set the internationally
recognized criteria defining a refugee. It was initially created to address the protection
needs of millions of refugees displaced within Europe following World War Two.
According to Article I of the Convention, a refugee is:
any person who… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
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as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it. (Article 1, 1951 Refugee Convention).
The treaty also defines the concept of non- refoulement, which prohibits parties of
the contract from pushing refugees back into territory where they faced persecution. The
concept is highlighted in article 33:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.” (Article 33, 1951 Refugee Convention).
All 147 parties are expected to practice the treaty by implementing it in their respective
national legislations. The EU has applied the principles of the Refugee Convention in its
own legislation regarding refugees - the Common European Asylum System.
Refugee or Economic Migrant?
Over the years, new conflicts and threats have challenged the Refugee
Convention’s definition of a refugee. For example, individuals fleeing persecution
because of sexual orientation are not explicitly protected under the convention, nor is
someone escaping natural disaster induced by climate change. Most problematic for
economic migrants entering Europe, somebody escaping abject poverty is also not
considered a refugee under the Refugee Convention. Naturally, European leaders who
oppose immigration, such as the Prime Ministers of Slovakia and Hungary, claim that
many of these “refugees” entering Europe are in fact “economic migrants” (The
Economist, 2015, “How many migrants to Europe are refugees?”). How a person is
labeled ultimately determines their legal status and eligibility for international protection.
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There is a vigorous debate in EU politics and the mainstream media over the terminology
applied to the thousands of migrants streaming toward Europe, situated as “economic
migrant vs. refugee”.
The vast majority of people entering Europe come from refugee-producing
countries plagued by political persecution. According to the United Nations, over 53% of
those arriving irregularly by sea are Syrian followed by Afghans (18%), Iraqis (6%) and
Eritreans (5%) (UNHCR 2015, “Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response”). Nationals
from these war-torn countries usually qualify for refugee status after an official status
determination is carried out. Economic migrants who endure the same perilous journey to
Europe are not protected as refugees yet. Perhaps Somali British Poet Warsan Shire said
it best: “no one puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the
land" (“Home”). Given that the majority of individuals fleeing the global south and
headed for Europe through the Mediterranean and overland routes eventually qualify for
refugee status, this paper will use the word “refugee” in reference to anyone crossing the
Mediterranean to reach Europe.
Overview
Refugees have existed since the beginning of humanity. Wherever conflict
existed, an inevitable mass exodus of refugees ensued. Currently, the number of people
worldwide that have been forcibly displaced stands at sixty million, the highest number
ever recorded. Most disturbingly, over half of these refugees are children (UNHCR,
“Worldwide displacement”, June 2015). The overwhelming majority of these refugees
have been hosted by countries in the developing world. There, they wait on the outskirts
of the host states’ society- either in refugee camps or urban settlements, for the
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opportunity to one-day return home. But as conflicts persist and new ones form, the
prospects of ever returning home become increasingly bleak. Poorer countries are
struggling to accommodate their own citizenry, let alone the rising number of people
pushed into their borders by conflict. Resources become strained, living conditions
worsen and eventually, a tipping point is reached. For many, Europe has not only
emerged as a more attractive destination but one that is perceived as the only option that
can provide hope for the future. Unfortunately, the scarcity of legal channels into the EU
has caused many refugees fleeing political violence in the Middle East and Africa to rely
on violent criminal networks that smuggle them on unseaworthy vessels across the
Mediterranean.
The unprecedented influx of refugees into Europe during 2015 has caused
countries within the European Union (EU) to scramble for a coordinated solution. This
paper will argue that two main factors, rising nationalism, and a broken asylum system,
have inhibited the EU’s ability to effectively tackle the crisis. The influx of refugees has
created tensions between the EU superstructure and its member states. These tensions not
only exacerbate the humanitarian situation but also threaten the very solidarity that the
EU was founded on. The EU’s future will be shaped in part by its response to the current
refugee influx via its asylum regime.
The Sparks of the Arab Spring
In many cases, the refugee crisis in Europe can be traced back to the Arab Spring,
a series of anti-government uprisings against autocratic regimes across the Middle East.
While many of the demonstrations throughout the Arab world calmed after a couple
years, some turned violent resulting in all-out civil war. The ongoing wars in Syria and
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Libya, for example, have played a significant role in the unprecedented influx of refugees
arriving in Europe. Syria’s civil war has contributed to a massive increase in refugees
while Libya’s deteriorating security has made it a major gateway into Europe.
In Libya, the Arab Spring resulted in the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi, who had
been the autocratic leader of the country for over three decades. Since 2004, Libya was
paid to serve as an extension of Europe's “externalized” border controls. Ghaddafi’s
regime intercepted migrants off the Libyan coast that were en route to Europe and
incarcerated them in destitute detention centers where inmates were often subjected to
violence, rape, and torture (Interview with Federico Fossi, Rome, Italy, Sep.8 2015). The
NATO-sponsored overthrow of Ghaddafi in 2011 resulted in a violent power vacuum that
opened a new route into Europe. Libya’s lawlessness allowed smuggler networks to
thrive off the desperation of migrants and refugees seeking a better life. The Libyan coast
went from being a buffer zone to a major launch pad into Europe, where thousands of
refugees are smuggled on unseaworthy vessels across the central Mediterranean. Often
times, these boats can capsize killing everyone on board. Unsurprisingly, the central
Mediterranean has been the scene of some of the deadliest maritime disasters of the 21st
century.
Like Ghaddafi, Bashar Al-Assad, Syria’s president, has governed his country
through a ruthless dictatorship. Assad, a Shia Alawite Muslim, is a minority leader who
has ruled over a Sunni majority Syrian population since 2000. As demonstrations across
his country criticized his regime’s oppressive policies, he responded by cracking down
hard - openly firing on demonstrators, turning an uprising into all-out civil war by 2012.
While the protests were initially secular, the war became religiously polarizing, as Sunni
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rebel factions went to war with the Shiite government. Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and
Qatar openly financed the rebels while Iran’s Shiite government supported Assad with
funds, and military support.
As Syria became the battleground of a sectarian proxy war, Sunni extremist
groups like the so-called “Islamic State” or ISIS emerged in the fight against Assad. The
terrorist organization expanded rapidly, taking over large swaths of land in order to
establish its totalitarian Islamist vision. In the process, ISIS persecuted thousands of
religious minorities who did not adhere to its strict and perverted interpretation of Islam.
Today, the Islamic State is believed to be the richest terrorist organization in history, with
an estimated net worth of over two billion dollars (Alexander, p.62). They receive a daily
revenue of two million dollars by selling oil from Iraq and Syria to the black market
(Alexander, p.62). The Islamic State’s troubling presence has incited super powers like
Russia and the United States to also engage in the war. The Syrian people are trapped
between Assad’s ruthless regime, various rebel groups, constant air strikes from Russia
and a US-led military coalition, and religious extremists (such as the Islamic State). The
human toll has been devastating as both the Syrian regime and the opposition have
arbitrarily targeted civilian areas (Roth, LA Times, “Protect the Civilians”, Nov.2015).
So far, the war has claimed over 310,000 lives, and forcibly displaced over 4.5 million
more - making Syria “the world’s top source country of refugees, overtaking
Afghanistan, which had held this position for more than three decades.” (UNHCR, “Facts
and Figures about Refugees”)
Neighboring countries in the region like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey have
hosted the overwhelming majority of displaced Syrians. Nearly two million Syrian
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refugees live in Turkey, more than any other country. In Lebanon, where formal refugee
camps for Syrians do not exist, there are over a million Syrians, making up a quarter of
its total population. According to the UNHCR, about 70% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
live below the poverty line. Although fewer in number, more than 85% of Jordan’s
629,245 Syrian refugees live below the national poverty line (UNHCR report, 26 August
2015). The majority of Syrian refugees displaced in the Middle East live outside of
camps, and self settle in urban areas.
As the war in Syria continues, refugee camps continue to be overpopulated and
undersupplied. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
primary organization providing support for camps in the region is severely underfunded,
contributing to deteriorating living conditions for Syrians who are displaced. By the end
of August 2015, The United Nations Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, which
manages humanitarian aid for Syrians in neighboring countries, received a mere 37% of
the $4.5 billion request needed to fund the year (Grant, “UN agencies 'broke and
failing”). With limited funding, the UN has been forced to cut vital aid in many areas
resulting in a decline of essential services such as shelter, financial aid, health care, and
food assistance. Take for instance, Fatmeh, a Syrian refugee in Lebanon who described
her troubles following UN cuts: “When we can’t afford both medicine and food, I tie
scarves around my boys’ bellies at night so they don’t wake up crying from stomach
aches because they are hungry” (Grant, “UN agencies 'broke and failing”). According to
Andrej Mahecic, an official for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
“Conditions in neighboring countries have deteriorated considerably and the protection
space is shrinking rapidly, some Syrians are deciding to move on [to Europe]” (Erlanger,
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Tamura, 2015, “UN Funding Shortfalls”). The lack of safe and legal migration channels
to seek asylum in Europe forces refugees to make the perilous journey across the
Mediterranean and rely so heavily on violent smuggler networks. Although the journey
itself can be life threatening, to many it is the only option to continue living again.
Europe is perceived as providing the only opportunity to work, be educated, and live full
dignified lives.
The Routes
There are two main routes by which refugees find their way to Europe. These are
the eastern Mediterranean (from Turkey to Greece) and the Central Mediterranean (from
North Africa to Italy and Malta). Until 2015, the central Mediterranean route was by far
the most popular. Due to poor seaworthiness, many boats carrying refugees capsize
before ever reaching their destination. Out of the total 3,279 refugees that died crossing
the Mediterranean in 2014, 2,447 were killed on the central route, making it the world’s
deadliest path to protection (BBC, “The Mediterranean's deadly migrant routes”). Libya
serves as an ideal “transit” country for human smuggler operations, not only because of
weak governance but also because of its strategic location. The small Italian island of
Lampedusa is actually closer to the African coast than it is to Sicily or mainland Italy
(Hobbs, 2007, p.72). Unsurprisingly, Lampedusa has served as the prime destination for
those smuggled off the Libyan coast.
The eastern Mediterranean emerged as the route of choice by 2015. The smuggler
industry expanded to Turkey where refugees, most of whom were fleeing conflicts in
Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan could reach the Greek islands of Kos and Lesbos, which are
less than three miles off the Turkish coast. In fact, the IOM reported that the Greek
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islands saw an average of 7,000 people arriving by boat a day during the first week of
October 2015 (IOM Report, 9 October 2015). In many instances, the Greek Coast Guard
rescues hundreds of refugees trapped at sea at a time. If spotted by the Turkish Coast
Guard, however, they are sent back to Turkey.
For many refugees, Greece is not the final target destination due to its unstable
economy. Most refugees fleeing conflict from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan continue to
make their way north through the Western Balkans route to reach wealthier EU countries
like Germany. This route is something like a massive modern day underground railroad,
crossing seven countries - Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Austria and
Germany. However, many countries on the way have deployed their armies and closed
their borders, leaving thousands of refugees stranded at a time with limited resources.
States like Hungary have cracked down hard. By the fall of 2015, Hungary had
completed a controversial razor-wire fence across its borders with neighboring Serbia and
Croatia to stem the migration flow. “It is like a big river of people, and if you stop the
flow, you will have floods somewhere. That’s what’s happening now” argued UNHCR
spokeswoman Melita Sunjic following Hungary’s border closure, which left over 10,000
refugees stranded in Serbia (Al Jazeera, “Thousands of Refugees Stranded”). Reaching
Hungary is a critical part of the journey because it is part of the Schengen zone - the area
in Europe where people can move freely without a passport. That means once refugees
reach Hungary, they can cross through any of the twenty-two countries in the bloc.
Following the closure of Hungary’s border, many refugees took a detour route from
Serbia, crossing through Croatia, Slovenia, and eventually the Schengen state of Austria.
Tragedies Along the Way
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Wake Up Call: Lampedusa’s Deadly Shipwreck
On October 2nd, 2013 a boat carrying an estimated 500 refugees, mainly from wartorn Eritrea, capsized just 70 miles of the Lampedusan coast. Over 360 people were
killed. The disaster sent shockwaves throughout Europe and focused international
attention on the EU. For Italy, ignoring the crisis was no longer an option; it was literally
too close to home. The Lampedusa shipwreck was the catalyst for greater European
intervention in migrant crossings over the Mediteranean.
Deadly Learning Curves of Operations at Sea
Within the same month (October 2013), Italy launched the first search and rescue
operation in the Mediterranean called “Mare Nostrum” which was widely regarded as a
success. According to Amnesty International, the program had rescued over 140,000
people stranded at sea in just the first year since its inception (Amnesty International,
“Operation Triton cannot replace Operation Mare Nostrum”, Dec.2014). In addition to
saving lives, the mission effectively tackled the smuggler networks, convicting more than
100 human traffickers in the process (Yardley, “Migration Crisis Puts Europe’s Policy
Missteps Into Focus”). Italy’s Mare Nostrum also offered vital legal and humanitarian
relief for those that needed it. The problem, however, was that the mission was costing
the debt-stricken Italian government an average of over nine million Euros per month
(Amnesty International, “Operation Triton cannot replace Operation Mare Nostrum”,
Oct.2014). Italy was left alone in dealing with this crisis as European states argued
whether or not the search and rescue mission was providing an “unintended pull factor”
for migrants to come to Europe. The British Foreign Office minister Baroness Anolay
defended the United Kingdom’s refusal to support search and rescue missions:
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“We believe that they create an unintended 'pull factor,' encouraging more
migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more tragic
and unnecessary deaths." (Taylor, “Why Britain won’t save drowning migrants in
the Mediterranean”, Washington Post)
The project proved too costly for Italy to handle on its own. Due to financial
constraints, the country declared that it would end its program on October 2014, but
warned that its closure would lead to a dramatic increase in migrant deaths. This crisis
was no longer just an Italian problem, it was a European problem, and demanded a
coordinated response. By November 2014, the EU responded by launching the Triton
program that was to be carried out by Frontex - the EU’s border agency. One might
assume that because the EU is operating the Triton mission, it would be significantly
more effective than a single-state operation; however, this was not the case. Not only was
the Triton program allocated a mere three million Euros a month (a third of what Italy
spent on its own) but it also monitored an area less than thirty miles off the European
coast compared to the vast 100 nautical miles covered by the Mare Nostrum mission
(Amnesty International, “Blueprint for Action”). As UNHCR spokesperson Federico
Fossi pointed out, this was a step in the wrong direction. “It was not a search and rescue
operation, it was a border control operation” he said in regards to Triton. “We knew that
most of the distress calls came from international waters, or even Libyan waters, so we
expressed concern, repeatedly calling for massive participation from all member states”
(Interview with Federico Fossi, Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015).
As a result, there was an immediate rise in maritime disasters due to boats
capsizing in areas that were not covered by Triton’s mandate area. Amnesty International
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claimed that the decision to end the Italian search and rescue mission had "contributed to
a dramatic increase in migrant and refugee deaths" - a claim borne out by statistics. For
instance, on April 19th 2015, a ship filled with migrants capsized just sixty miles off the
Libyan coast shortly after departing from Libya-resulting in the deaths of over 800
migrants according to an estimate by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR, “UNHCR welcomes EU Mediterranean plans, but says more needs
to be done”). This shipwreck is considered to be the deadliest maritime disaster to ever
occur in the Mediterranean. Many experts held Europe responsible, including Loris De
Flippi, the president of Doctors Without Borders who argued, "A mass grave is being
created in the Mediterranean Sea and European policies are responsible” (MSF, “MSF
calls for large scale search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean”). It took an
unprecedented disaster for Europe to realize that Triton needed serious changes. Within
weeks of the shipwreck, Triton funds were doubled, and the operational area was
extended to 138 nautical miles (Amnesty International, 2015, “A Safer Sea”).
The problem with Frontex was that it was a shift in the wrong direction-both in
terms of resources and its overall objective. Not only did the Mare Nostrum mission cost
more and cover more space, but the program also employed 900 military personnel
compared to Triton’s mere 56 officers (Davies, Nelson, “Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue
mission ‘puts thousands at risk’). Europe’s effort to save migrants in the Mediterranean
had been insufficient, underfunded and unproductive when compared to the Mare
Nostrum program Italy impressively managed on its own.
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The Common European Asylum System
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was created in 1999 to foster a
higher standard of protection for refugees through a collaborative effort that aimed to
harmonize common minimum standards for asylum in the EU. The CEAS constitutes a
set of directives called Asylum Procedures, Reception Conditions, Qualification,
Eurodac, and the Dublin Regulation. Many EU member states and human rights
organizations openly acknowledge that the CEAS has failed to properly respond to the
influx of refugees arriving in Europe (Bouckaert, HRW, “Europe’s Broken Asylum
System”, Sep.2015). If anything, it has proven to be counterproductive and
disadvantageous to both the EU and the refugees it aims to serve. Even if these laws were
strengthened, it is ultimately up to member states to enforce them. Still, the refugee crisis
has challenged the efficacy of the CEAS and even exposed its fundamental flaws.
One of the most controversial policies in the CEAS is the Dublin Regulation. This
policy requires asylum seekers to be processed by the first EU country in which they
initially arrived. The purpose of this regulation is to aid in the efficiency of determining
refugee status, prevent asylum seekers from filing for asylum in multiple EU states and
also to promote better monitoring mechanisms. The problem with this rule, however, is
that the majority of asylum seekers are continuing to arrive within Europe’s southern
periphery. EU member states in this region (such as Greece and Italy) are adversely
affected by this rule because it has imposed disproportionate responsibilities when
compared to other EU member states, notably wealthier northern European states that
have a greater capacity to resettle refugees and asylum seekers. The Dublin Regulation
rule essentially coerces southern peripheral European countries to absorb massive
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amounts of migrants on their own. Consequent, migrant detention facilities in these
countries are becoming more densely populated and overrun as more people arrive in
record numbers. In September 2015, the European Commission proposed a review of the
flawed Dublin Regulation and a quota system aimed at distributing the burden of
refugees and asylum-seekers throughout the EU countries more equally.
The proposed quota system would relocate refugees from peripheral states like
Greece, Italy, and Hungary across the EU. The number of refugees each member state
would absorb would be dependent on the country’s GDP, population size, unemployment
rate and number of asylum applications already processed. Despite much contention from
several European countries, the proposal still passed. The plan aims to relocate the
modest figure of 120,000 refugees in Europe over a two-year period, which is only a
fraction of the estimated 1.4 million refugees and asylum-seekers the UN expects to
arrive in Europe by the end of 2016 (Simon, “UN sees 1.4 million migrant arrivals in
Europe in 2015-2016”). The CEAS remains at the core of this problem and its failures
have forced the EU to put forward ineffective ad-hoc responses. Until the EU can come
together to dramatically revise its broken asylum regime, in a way that expands safe and
legal migration channels for those outside of Europe - its refugee crisis will only
intensify.
Rise of Xenophobia and Xenophobic Violence
A rising wave of xenophobia has permeated throughout contemporary European
politics and society. Many right wing nationalist parties in Europe claim that
immigration threatens the continent’s national and cultural identity. Even though the EU
asserts that it was founded on a commitment to promote human rights, the actions and
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rhetoric from some of its member states tell a different story. Countries in Eastern
Europe, such as Hungary, have responded to refugees arriving at their border with
hostility and repressive tactics that blatantly defy EU values. Unsurprisingly, this
defiance has created a rift between the EU leadership and its member states. Xenophobia
- whether direct or indirect, not only prevents the EU from generating a collective
solution to the refugee crisis but also undermines the EU system as a whole.
As more people from conflict zones in the Middle East continue to seek asylum in
Europe, the fear of a perceived “Muslim invasion” has grown. For many Europeans, the
prospect of becoming a minority in one’s homeland is a rising threat. They worry that the
influx of refugees can dilute their country’s relatively homogenous cultural identity,
increase the risk of terrorism and exploit the welfare system. Far right nationalist parties
have capitalized on these fears, mobilizing an anti-immigrant, anti-EU (Eurosceptic) and
“anti-Islamization” agenda. Alarmingly, these parties have continued to surge in the polls
during the refugee crisis (“BBC, 2014, “Eurosceptic 'earthquake' rocks EU elections”).
The 2014 European Parliament elections resulted in historic victories for
Eurosceptic nationalist parties across the continent. In France, the National Front party
won the majority of votes. "It's a bad day for the European Union, when a party with a
racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic program gets 25% of the vote" said Martin Schulz,
the former president of the European Parliament (“BBC, 2014, “Eurosceptic 'earthquake'
rocks EU elections”). Also topping the EU parliamentary elections was the UK’s
polarizing United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Nigel Farage, UKIP’s leader,
positioned his party’s policies to be critical of both the EU and Muslim migration.
Although UKIP claims they are not racist, their own founder, Alan Sked, has distanced
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himself from what he calls the “monster” he helped create. In a scathing opinion piece
about UKIP posted by The Atlantic, Sked wrote:
A party that was once moderate, outward-looking, and devoted to preserving
parliamentary democracy has mutated into a conduit for right-wing xenophobia,
Islamophobia, homophobia, racism, and the denigration of immigrants. (Sked,
2015,“Confessions of a British Politician”)
Sked’s criticisms demonstrate how the refugee crisis can transform the entire identity of
some political parties, as they respond to shifting public concerns and contexts. The
timing of UKIP’s transformation and success should come as no surprise. Like its
nationalist counterparts across Europe, UKIP uses fear-mongering tactics to lure political
support.
In Denmark, a similar political shakeup occurred. A nationalist party called the
Danish People’s Party won the most votes in the EU Parliamentary elections and became
Denmark’s second largest party following the 2015 general elections. The antiimmigration DPP appealed to voters by advocating for tougher border controls, a policy
that directly conflicts with its membership in the passport-free Schengen zone.
Meanwhile, the greatest political shift came in Poland, where the Law and Justice (PiS)
party won both the presidency and the highest number of seats in parliament. PiS’s
chairman, Jarosław Kaczyński, warned that Muslim refugees could bring infectious
diseases to Europe. The World Health Organization summarily dismissed his claim,
reporting that there is "no systematic association between migration and the importation
of infectious diseases…the risk for importation of exotic and rare infectious agents into
Europe by refugees or migrants is exceedingly low” (WHO report, September 2015).
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Far right nationalist parties have even received a rise in support in leftist countries
like Greece and Germany. In Germany, an organization called the Patriotic Europeans
against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) emerged in 2014. They organize weekly
protests in Dresden, Germany criticizing the government’s “open door” policy towards
refugees. At its peak, their rallies have seen over 25,000 people in attendance. This is
especially troubling since Germany has witnessed more anti-immigrant related hate
crimes than any other country in Europe. Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior
recorded 202 attacks on shelters for asylum-seekers during the time period of JanuaryJuly 2015—nearly the same amount of recorded attacks in all of 2014. Of the 202 attacks,
175 were linked to right-wing extremist groups (Somaskanda, “Germany Has A Refugee
Problem”).
Greece’s third largest political party known as the “Golden Dawn” establishes its
entire platform based on racist anti-immigration policies. The group’s imagery and hate
speech is eerily reminiscent of Nazi Germany. Running on the campaign slogan "So we
can rid this land of filth,” Golden Dawn has consistently blamed the country’s debt
problems on migrants. Human rights organizations have even accused the party of
mobilizing arbitrary attacks on migrants and asylum seekers. The situation had
deteriorated so badly by 2012 that Human Rights Watch published a 99-page report that
documented several accounts of Greece’s xenophobic violence. In one instance,
…in central Athens, gangs of Greeks (affiliated with Golden Dawn), in apparent
retaliation for the killing, indiscriminately attacked migrants and asylum seekers,
chasing them through the streets, dragging them off buses, beating and stabbing
them.” (2012, Page.3 HRW, “Hate in the Streets”)
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In 2013, Golden Dawn member Giorgos Roupakias admitted to murdering Greek
hip-hop artist and social activist, Pavlos Fyssa. Greek authorities responded by also
charging seventy members of Golden Dawn (including its elected 17 members of
parliament) with membership in a criminal organization as the group had been linked to
over 300 migrant assaults (Smith, “Golden Dawn leaders brought to court to face charges
of murder and assault”). The group’s leader, Nikolaos Michaloliakos was charged with
murder, money laundering, blackmail and illegal possession of arms. Despite all this,
Golden Dawn once again managed to win enough votes in the 2015 election to remain
Greece’s third largest party.
The Case of Hungary
Hungary has been a flashpoint in this crisis and its Prime Minister, Victor Orban,
has often times been viewed as its antagonist. Orban and his right wing Fidesz party
continues to develop draconian policies towards refugees that are inconsistent with EU
and international refugee law. Take, for instance, the Hungarian law passed by parliament
in early September of 2015 that criminalizes those who cross its borders illegally - in
direct contravention of refugee rights. If convicted, refugees could face imprisonment for
up to three years. The law also punishes those who damage the fence or helps migrants
and refugees cross the border with up to five years in prison. The move was widely
condemned by the international community and human rights organizations. John
Dalhusien, Amnesty International’s Director for Europe and Central Asia, proclaimed
that
Hungary is effectively transforming itself into a refugee protection free zone,
with blatant disregard for its human rights obligations and the obvious need to
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work with other EU and Balkan countries to find collective, humane solutions to
the current crisis. (Amnesty International, 2015, “Hungary: EU must formally
warn Hungary over refugee crisis violations”)
Amnesty International warned that the “criminalization and detention of refugees
contradicts Article 31 of the Geneva Convention which bans imposition of penalties upon
refugees for entering a country irregularly. In practice, refugees often have no choice but
to enter a country in breach of its immigration laws” (Amnesty International, 2015,
“Urgent Action: Hungary Violate Human Rights of Refugees”). Hungary insists that
those arriving at its borders are no longer in need of international protection because they
had already crossed through a number of countries it considers “safe” (like Turkey). The
Hungarian prime minister justified his anti-immigrant policies with xenophobic rhetoric
in an op-ed where he argued:
Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically
different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims…This is an
important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in
Christianity…Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely
able to keep Europe Christian?...There is no alternative, and we have no option
but to defend our borders. (Mackey, 2015, "Hungarian Leader Rebuked”)
In September 2015, Orban “defended” his borders by deploying riot police that
openly fired water cannons and teargas at a crowd of refugees on its border with Serbia.
As previously mentioned, many refugees do not wish to seek asylum in Hungary, but
simply cross through in order to reach wealthier EU states. Yet his regime continues to
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persecute those fleeing persecution. These actions suggest that Hungary isn’t only
concerned with protecting its national identity, but also Europe’s. Orban’s right wing
regime has essentially appointed itself as the frontier protecting Europe from a purported
“Muslim invasion.”
Justified Fears?
Europe’s rise in xenophobia demonstrates a real concern to preserve national
identity. But is this concern warranted? Arjun Appadurai’s “Fear of Small Numbers”
argues “even the smallest minority within national boundaries is seen as an intolerable
deficit in the purity of the national whole” (Appadurai, p.53). He argues that the fear of
minority groups stems from the majority’s “anxiety of incompleteness” (Appadurai, p.9).
Unsurprisingly, this “anxiety” has manifested into the xenophobia we see in Europe
today, where states are largely defined by their homogeneity.
If one were to analyze the crisis strictly through numbers, they would realize that
not only is the claim of a "Muslim invasion" xenophobic, but also unfounded. Consider
the fact that Lebanon, a small developing country (4,010 square miles in size), hosts more
refugees than all of the countries in the EU combined. Suppose the EU granted asylum to
all 4.5 million registered Syrian refugees around the world - they would make up less
than .09% of the EU’s total population. Put simply, the EU welcomes a small proportion
of refugees compared to smaller developing countries, yet this minimal policy has created
a sense of panic.
With these numbers in perspective, the clichéd excuse of "preserving national
identity" no longer holds weight. Xenophobia has helped fuel the crisis in Europe just as
much as its failed refugee regime has. In order to become the human rights trailblazer that
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the EU prides itself in being, member states must overcome their destructive xenophobic
habits. Only then can they find a collective solution that sets the tone for how refugees
are treated in Europe and around the world.
Where are the Gulf States?
Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar are
not only some of the richest countries in the Middle East, but also the world. All three of
these countries are Sunni powers in the region with a strong interest in seeing Syria’s
Shiite leader, Bashar Al-Assad, ousted. In serving their geopolitical interests, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have all spent millions of dollars financing the Syrian
opposition, which has only exacerbated the war and the humanitarian situation. While
wealthy Gulf States have had no problem providing Sunni rebel factions with advanced
weaponry and funds (Gardner, BBC, “Gulf Arabs”) - they have done virtually nothing to
host Syrian refugees who have become displaced by the violence they helped fuel.
Amnesty International highlighted in a report that in all of 2014, “The six Gulf
countries - Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain - have
offered zero resettlement places to Syrian refugees” (Amnesty International, Dec.2014).
Gulf countries have responded to the criticisms by claiming that they have welcomed
thousands of Syrians to their country and provided millions of dollars in humanitarian
aid. While true, it doesn’t address the fact that not one country in the Gulf is a signatory
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and that only Syrians with a work visa can enter the
Gulf States legally. Even then, they are unable to apply for citizenship.
Refugee policy in the Gulf, for the most part, is non-existent and its borders are
closed to anyone fleeing persecution. The irony is that Gulf countries are far more
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capable of accommodating refugees than Jordan and Lebanon. States like Qatar and the
UAE have become economic powerhouses largely in part by welcoming migration. In
fact, migrants outnumber the native populations in both Qatar and the UAE (although
they do not have full rights at the natives). These countries have a history of welcoming
migrants and turning them into productive citizens. Yet when it comes to Syrian refugees,
the Gulf has been inexplicably reluctant. If the Gulf had the political will to assist with
the humanitarian situation, they would help with the resettlement of millions of displaced
Syrians. Their inability to do so has only helped push more Syrians across the
Mediterranean, risking their lives to make it to Europe.
2.0 Methodology
Fieldwork
My field research was conducted in Rome, Italy for seven days from September
2-9, 2015. The objective of this fieldwork was to personally engage refugees and human
rights professionals in the non-profit and international non-governmental organization
sectors by asking them a series of open-ended questions. I visited and interviewed staff
and clients at volunteer assistance centers such as the Joel Nafuma Refugee Center
(JNRC), Migration, Asylum and Social Integration Center, and Jesuit Refugee Services. I
also interviewed large transnational organization representatives such as those at the
International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees.
All my subjects were informed on how their information would be used. Prior to
the interview, I made it clear that they would be recorded, and would be given the option
to refuse any question they did not wish to answer. All my subjects were advised that
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they could use a pseudonym if they wished. The interviews were asked in the form of
open-ended questions based off specific interview guides for each subject that I
developed prior to leaving San Francisco. The interview guide for refugees, for example,
contains questions regarding their reasons for fleeing to Europe, the process by which
they arrived, and their current living conditions (compared to previous conditions in their
country of origin). Interviews with human rights experts focused on the Common
European Asylum System, push/pull factors, and their organizational efforts to respond.
All interviewees were fluent in English therefore translation was not needed.
As a researcher using human subjects I understood the importance of participant
confidentiality and data security. In accordance with the IRB protocol at USF, I ensured
that I made all qualitative data that could be used to identify subjects confidential. I
removed major identifying details and replaced these details with pseudonyms. All
subjects were informed of this practice before the interviews were conducted. My data
was collected primarily though a voice recorder on my smartphone, which is protected by
a passcode. In between each interview I quickly uploaded the file to my computer, and
transcribed my interviews. The transcriptions were uploaded on a secure and password
protected flash drive.
Recruitment and Sampling Strategy
Before my trip, I researched all relevant organizations based in Rome, compiling
a list of over forty well-qualified candidates. I wanted to ensure that I gave those on the
front lines of the refugee crisis in Europe a voice in my paper - from lead
intergovernmental organizations to local nonprofits, and the refugees they serve. To do
this, I sent out a mass email to all the organizations I listed - introducing myself,
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explaining the purpose of my research and dates I would be available. I then created a
calendar that included the time and location of each scheduled meeting.
The two refugees I interviewed, Adan and Omar, were Malian refugees who lived
and worked at the Joel Nafuma Refugee Center (JNRC) in Rome. I chose to interview
Adan and Omar because they both spoke English, escaped persecution in Mali and paid
to be smuggled through the Central Mediterranean (Africa to Italy or Malta) – the
deadliest route to Europe. Furthermore, both Adan and Omar had already experienced the
EU asylum process since they entered Europe irregularly in 2012.
Interview Strategy
During my field research, I used two different interview strategies - semistructured interviews with human rights professionals and unstructured interviews with
refugees. According to Russell Bernard’s “Methods in Anthropology,” semi-structural
interviews use open-ended questions that follow a script and are mainly used with
“high-level bureaucrats and elite members of a community—people who are accustomed
to efficient use of their time” (Bernard, p.212). This method was ideal for my interviews
with human rights professionals because many of them were in leadership positions
within their respective organizations and allocated a fixed time for our interviews. The
open-ended questions facilitated great discussion and created a more natural dialogue.
My script allowed me to quickly refer to follow up questions, and key facts for
interviewees to expand on. My respondents reacted very well to this technique, answering
each question for several minutes at a time, which significantly extended the set duration
of each interview.
I used unstructured interviews with refugees due to the sensitive and
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unpredictable nature when dealing with people who may have endured a traumatic
experience. According to Bernard, unstructured interviews are best for learning about the
“lived experience of fellow human beings” (Bernard, p.213), which were ideal for my
interviews with Adan and Omar since I wanted to learn about their experiences in dealing
with violent smugglers. I used my guide to help me set the agenda, rather than asking all
the questions verbatim. This allowed for a more human interaction, giving my informants
the ability to lead the conversation without getting off-topic and express themselves on
their own terms and pace (Bernard, p.211).
3.0 Literature Review
The EU’s Identity Crisis
The European Union is still very much regarded as an experiment. Formed in
1993, it is a product of political negotiation in a continent that had been historically
plagued by conflict. For years, member states mutually reaped the benefits of the EU
system, including internal free trade, common external tariffs and open borders. In spite
of this, the same system responsible for bringing together much of Europe is also a source
of European continental tension, in the event that a common response to the refugee crisis
has not been realized.
But how does the EU play a role in forging a sense of “community” in Europe? Is
it possible to create a communal relationship amongst many different nations, containing
different ethnicities and languages? Benedict Anderson describes a nation as an
“imagined political community” which is both “inherently limited and sovereign.” Where
“members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members,
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
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communion” (Anderson, 2006:p.6). For example, an American living in Florida will
never meet the three hundred million plus Americans that live across the country, but
they are bound by the fact that they are all “American” experiencing life in the same
country simultaneously- regardless of who they are and where in the U.S. they live. To
Anderson, members in an “imagined community” have a shared understanding of the
political space in which they coexist. Despite the fact that people living in this space
never know each other personally, they feel “deep, horizontal” connections to
“comradeship” that has created a “fraternity” amongst one another making that
community possible (Anderson, p.7). This “fraternity” is even stronger in many European
nations, which, unlike the U.S., are primarily composed of distinct and homogenous
populations.
Despite the fact that the EU is composed of several different nations, they are all
part of a broader European “imagined community” the EU seeks to achieve. The EU,
reinforcing a pan-European identity, operates as a political authority that exercises power
over an imagined community of European citizens. In order to actualize the concept of
the EU, symbols are used to create expressions of community. These symbols help make
the abstract relationship between the EU’s different member states and its people feel
more intimate. American historian, Michael Waltzer describes the significance of
political symbols by arguing that “The state is invisible; it must be personified before it
can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived”
(Walzer 1967, p. 194). The EU is no exception - using symbols in the form of a common
currency (Euro), passport, flag, anthem, and regional policy (such as the Common
European Asylum System) that unite its various peoples across state lines. However, the

	
  

30
vitality of the EU is contingent on how the EU system and its symbols interact with
national identities. Often times these symbols and institutionalized practices work
congruously with member states and their identities, particularly when EU membership is
beneficial to them (ex. free movement of labor, goods, services and capital). However,
the refugee crisis is creating a direct and disproportional clash between the various
national, regional, and/or local level identities and the transnational European identity,
sparking tension between nation-state sovereignty and the EU political system. The
unprecedented influx of refugees arriving in Europe may very well change a nation’s
demographics, identity, and culture; a change many EU member states are reluctant to
accept. As the EU gridlocks over a collective political solution to the current refugee
influx, the rise of nationalism amidst an escalating refugee crisis continues to threaten the
very social fabric or “imagined community” that holds the EU together.
The Maastricht Treaty (the founding legislation of the EU) highlights the purpose
of promoting social cohesion and solidarity amongst member states. But as countries
disagree on how to manage the refugees coming into their borders, the very solidarity the
EU was founded on is now threatened. Member states are split on how to respond to the
refugee crisis. Some, abiding by the Maastricht Treaty’s firm commitment to the
protection and compliance of human rights and fundamental freedoms are welcoming to
refugees, such as Germany. Others, fueled by xenophobia and nationalism, have stood
firm on securing and closing their borders.
This phenomenon is best described in Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of
Civilizations” (1993). Huntington hypothesizes that the “principal conflicts of global
politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations” (1993: p.22).
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His paper puts into perspective why some nations are wary of accepting foreigners.
According to Huntington, a person’s political and economic identity is more mutable than
his or her culture. Thus, one can go from poor to rich or from a communist to a democrat,
but your cultural identity is one that sticks with you. The EU is comprised of millions of
people, all of whom carry different ethnicities and religions. Some member states are
more homogenous than others, making it easier to establish a national identity. But is it
possible for the EU as a whole to share a common European identity that can unite its
people together through the bad times as well as the good? The EU has undoubtedly
disrupted the traditional nation-state system. While European nationals still refer to their
country as a source of identity- the introduction of the EU has reinforced the concept of
what it means to be “European” and added another institutionalized layer of identity for
every citizen.
However, the characteristics of what makes up this “European Identity” remains
unclear. If being European is defined by believing in the EU’s common principles of
solidarity and human rights, then it can compliment, welcome, and integrate immigrants.
However, if it is defined simply by sharing a common historical inheritance in Europe,
exclusionary measures on “non-Europeans” will inevitably continue to be imposed. In
order for the EU to identify the best solution toward its refugee crisis, it must first and
foremost learn what it means to identify as “European.”
Why Some States Are Less Hospitable than Others
The majority of refugees arriving in Europe come from Muslim-majority
countries, such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. This could explain some European
member states’ reluctance to open their borders to thousands of Muslims. According to
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Huntington, conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has
been going on for over 1,300 years starting with the Muslim conquest of Spain in 711
AD.
Islamic and European civilizations have clashed from the eleventh to the
thirteenth century. The Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring
Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the
seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway
over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid
siege to Vienna (Huntington, 1993, p.31).
He claims, “On both sides, the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a
clash of civilizations” (p.32). Interestingly enough, Hungary, an EU member state that
was once the scene of the Ottoman-Habsburg wars from the 16th through the 18th
centuries, has been one of the least accommodating countries to Muslim refugees. This is
no coincidence.
“These are countries that have long histories of dealing with invasions from the
south,” said Mitchell Orenstein, a professor of Central and Eastern European Politics at
the University of Pennsylvania regarding Hungary and other parts of Central and
southeastern Europe that were once under Ottoman rule (Resnikoff, “Hungary’s
Rightward Shift”). “Hungary is full of former mosques because it was taken over briefly
by the Ottoman Empire. It was liberated via the Hapsburg Empire. So these things have
very deep resonance in countries that are more the borderlands of Europe" (Resnikoff,
“Hungary’s Rightward Shift”). Other nearby borderland countries may be experiencing a
similar resonance as policies towards refugees suggest that a fear of a “Muslim invasion”
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still lingers. Slovakia, for example, another European country once occupied by Ottoman
forces, will only accept up to 200 refugees, contingent that they are all Christian rather
than Muslim. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have expressed their disdain with
refugees by refusing to accept refugee quotas proposed by the European Commission.
"Refugees from a completely different cultural background would not be in a good
position in the Czech Republic," argued Czech President Milo Zeman (Tharoor,
“Slovakia will take in 200 Syrian refugees”). Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico
defended his country's tough stance on accepting migrants by saying "Since Slovakia is a
Christian country, we cannot tolerate an influx of 300,000-400,000 Muslim immigrants
who would like to start building mosques all over our land and trying to change the
nature, culture and values of the state” (Tharoor, “Slovakia will take in 200 Syrian
refugees”). These anti-immigrant sentiments are widespread across eastern parts of
central Europe. In fact, this region is precisely where Huntington defines a significant
dividing line that marks the boundary of the eastern part of Western Christianity.
Huntington argues that this line marks the “cultural division of Europe between Western
Christianity (west of the line) and Orthodox Christianity and Islam (east of the line)”
(1993:p.31). This line also happens to coincide with the historic borders between the
Hapsburg and Ottoman empires.
It is no surprise the states lying at the crossroads of what Huntington calls the
“eastern boundary of Western Christianity” serves as flashpoints for debates on European
identity and refugees. According to Huntington, “the most important conflicts of the
future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one
another” (1993:p.25). Right wing politicians from countries such as Poland, Czech
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Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary incite fear by warning of a “Muslim Invasion” despite
the fact that the majority of refugees are merely crossing through to seek asylum in other
parts of Europe. Their geography and history with Muslims have helped generate
protectionist politics that strive to maintain boundaries Christian Europe and the Muslim
East.
The "Arab Problem"
The resistance of some European states to accept refugees can be attributed to the
fact that the majority of them are Arab. Europe's encounter with the Middle East has a
history of generating an unflattering representation of Arabs and Muslims. Edward Said
(1979) uses the term “Orientalism” to deﬁne the West's cultural and ideological
portrayals of people living east of Europe, known as the “Orient” (1979). Colonialism
helped fuel the West's patronizing attitude towards people of the Orient. In Western
literature, the West has been depicted as superior to the East both politically and socially.
The Orientals appeared intrinsically “antidemocratic, backward, barbaric" (Said, 1979:
p.150). This was especially the case for Arab Muslims of the Middle East. Said quotes
British colonial administrator Evelyn Baring, who served as Consul-General of Egypt
from 1883–1907: "I content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the
Oriental generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European"
(Said 1979:p.39). The 19th century French diplomat referred to Arab Orientals as
"civilized man fallen again into a savage state" (Said, p.171). Over a century later, these
biased attitudes have re-emerged, as chauvinistic governments view refugees as
incompatible with European society.
For generations, this superiority has played a strong role in rationalizing the
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West's aggression in the region. In fact, military aggression was hardly ever viewed as a
conquest but rather a moral duty to deliver liberty. According to Said, "Everywhere, one
encountered Orientals, Arabs whose civilization, religion, and manners were so low,
barbaric, and antithetical as to merit reconquest" (Said, p.150). From the Crusades to the
colonization of the Middle East following World War One, to the US invasion of Iraq in
2003, the Middle East has a long and difficult history with Western incursions. One could
even argue that western involvements in the region have, at the very least, contributed to
the instability that has displaced millions of people, especially given that the Islamic State
emerged in the power vacuum created by the US-invasion in Iraq.
The post 9/11 era has reintroduced toxic western stereotypes of Middle Easterners
into European public discourse, largely by equating the Middle East and its people with
terrorism - a region that western armies fight to “liberate” from brutality. In this political
milieu, when hundreds of thousands of Arab Muslims fleeing violence arrive at Europe’s
doorsteps, panic ensues. To many nationalistic governments in the EU, these people
aren’t viewed as refugees in need of help, but rather a liability to national security,
stability, and identity.
Despite the fact that the EU prides itself on putting human rights at the forefront
of its agenda, EU members are split on how to respond to these refugees. With the sudden
arrival of thousands of Arab Muslim refugees, Orientalism has once again permeated
throughout European public discourse and policies - most notably in conservative media,
and certain national political approaches. Right-wing ultranationalists in Europe have
responded by taking a hardline on immigration. Consequentially, in many cases across
Europe, the nation-state is flexing its power over the EU system, unwilling to absorb
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large numbers of people who are perceived as the “complete opposite” of what it means
to be European (Said, 1979:p.39).
The Exception of the "Non-Citizen"
What exactly makes the movement of people across international borders a crisis
situation? Managing a sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers is
logistically difficult and places a significant strain on government resources. Nonetheless,
the lackluster response to this influx by the international community, particularly in the
developed West, demonstrates the nation state's tendency to prioritize the protection of its
sovereignty over the protection of human life. Hannah Arendt, once a refugee herself
escaping Nazi Germany, argued that the concept of human rights only applied to those
with specific qualities, particularly citizenship. In her experience as a refugee in Europe
during the 1930s and 40s, a person who lacked all the relevant qualities of being a citizen
“except that they were still human” had no rights (Arendt, 1973:p.299). According to
Arendt “We have really started to live in One World. Only with completely organized
humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion
from humanity altogether” (Arendt, 1973:p.297). Arendt is explaining a problem she
considers endemic around the world; once refugees are forced outside of their polity, they
are effectively stripped of their natural rights and expelled from humanity. Agamben
explains this phenomenon by referring to Arendt’s “Origins,” where he argues “In the
system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show
themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no
longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state” (Agamben, 1998: p.75). In
other words, human beings are not guaranteed a set of inalienable rights, only citizens.
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This rights conundrum can explain why many refugee camps in the Middle East
and elsewhere lack a political presence. The jurisdiction lies on the power of camp
administrators, in many cases the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Since refugees are not citizens of the country in which they live, they are not
recipients of certain rights and/or services granted by the state. They lack, what Arendt
calls “the right to have rights” (1973: p.296). We see this in Turkey, Lebanon, and
Jordan - where refugees have no clear legal right to work, although the 1951 Refugee
Convention guarantees this right. The stateless people that occupy refugee camps or
urban self settlements are often secluded from the host nation’s civic life, and blocked
from immersing themselves in society – in fact this is one of the primary policy reasons
why refugee camps are instituted. Because refugees are not members of the sovereign
state, they are distinguished from the “authentic life” of a citizen and considered as a “life
lacking every political value” (Agamben, p.78). Often times, refugees hold no political
identity and are excluded from the political realm of that country.
Host countries with exclusionary policies towards refugees contradict
international refugee law, which states that refugees should have access to courts, free
movement, education, work, and documentation (1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees). The nation state doesn’t recognize the refugee as a citizen with sacred life,
but rather a bare life living in a “state of exception" (Agamben 2005:p.1). The state of
exception, according to Agamben is the “state of imbalance between public law and
political fact,” where laws are suspended for providing continual security of the state particularly in times of an emergency. In many ways, refugee camps have served as a
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microcosm of Agamben’s “state of exception”. Here, the host state includes bare life in
politics solely through exclusion.
Refugees may be protected under international law, but those rights are contingent
on the cooperation of the host state to enforce them. For example, in formal camps across
Jordan and Turkey that host a portion of Syria’s 4.5 million refugees worldwide, the
“bare life” of Syrians are indeed living in the state of exception; stranded in overcrowded
camps with little to no hope other than returning to old lives in Syria. Taking this into
account, it isn’t hard to fathom why so many refugees in the region choose to cross the
Mediterranean to find a meaningful life for themselves and their families.
Once in the EU, refugees waiting on their asylum claim live in migrant detention
facilities. These facilities, similar to the refugee camp, are a space of exception because
they lack the rights afforded to EU citizens. Asylum seekers are technically protected and
guaranteed a certain level of reception under the EU’s Common European Asylum
System (CEAS), but it is ultimately up to the host member state to enforce these
measures. However, many EU countries - such as Italy and the United Kingdom have
outsourced their asylum services to for-profit private contractors (Trilling, “Europe’s
Migrant-Industrial Complex” 2015). Their indifference towards the life of the non-citizen
is evident. When contractors operate in a state of exception and are in charge of
implementing the rights of refugees, the pervasive exploitation of non-citizens become
common. In many cases, multinational corporations have been the center of corruption
and mistreatment of vulnerable refugees with little to no accountability (Trilling,
“Europe’s Migrant-Industrial Complex” 2015). A foreign policy report on Europe’s
privatized detention centers found:
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As Italy confronts its massive humanitarian challenge, the task of looking after
the new arrivals claiming asylum has become a lucrative business and has created
new opportunities for corruption. This month, one of the most notorious
corruption cases popped back into headlines when Italian police arrested 44
people, including prominent politicians, who they suspected of corruptly
allocating contracts to run migrant reception centers. (Trilling, “Europe’s
Migrant-Industrial Complex” 2015)
In Britain, two thirds of migrant detention centers are privately operated. Yarl
Wood, a private detention center run by a company called Serco just outside of London
was “the subject of repeated allegations about the sexual abuse of female detainees”
(Trilling, 2015). Asylum seekers are not allowed to work, as they are non-citizens. Their
space of exception is in the form of state-funded housing. According to the report:
When Britain began expanding its use of detention centers — prisons in all but
name for migrants who have claimed asylum or whose claims have failed and are
awaiting deportation — in the early 2000s, it welcomed private contractors to do
the work. According to British investigative journalist Clare Sambrook, this
“created a market” in which contractors sought to maximize their profits by
running the detention centers at low costs and allowing the state to neglect its
responsibility to care for migrants…Three multinationals — G4S, Serco, and
Clearel — now run these housing projects. A Public Accounts Committee report
in April 2014 said that the standard of accommodation was often ‘unacceptably
poor,’ while journalists have reported on asylum-seekers being forced to live in
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crowded, damp, and rat-infested homes. (Trilling, “Europe’s Migrant-Industrial
Complex”, 2015)
These accounts demonstrate some EU member states’ disregard for refugee rights.
Those waiting for their asylum claim have been put in a state of limbo, deprived of rights
granted to citizens and the rights granted to refugees as they await a verdict on their
asylum claim. States like Britain and Italy would rather pay private firms to handle their
“problem,” human beings who are marginalized simply because they lack the constructed
concept of citizenship.
Learning from History
Hanna Arendt’s work emerged at a time when the world, particularly Europe, did
little to protect Jews from persecution. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in a
pattern similar to Nazi Germany, has systematically carried out human rights violations
against ethnic and religious minorities as it takes over large swaths of land in the Middle
East. Syrians and Iraqis fleeing the Islamic State are in a similar predicament as the Jews
of Europe during the 1930s and 1940s - struggling to find protection. Describing the
plight of the Jews in Europe after WWI in the 1943 article “We Refugees,” Arendt notes
the following, which could equally be applied to refugees entering Europe today:
We actually live in a world where human beings as such have ceased to exist for a
while since society has discovered discrimination as the great social weapon by
which one may kill men without bloodshed; since passports or birth certificates,
and sometimes even income tax receipts, are no longer formal papers but matters
of social distinction. (Arendt, 2007:p.273)
The perilous journey refugees make to escape radical groups like ISIS is itself the
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outcome of the very "social distinctions" Arendt alludes to. Refugees escaping
persecution in much of the Middle East cannot apply for a visa until they are on European
soil not only because their own national bureaucracies have disintegrated, but also
because they will almost certainly be turned down for regular travel. Even then, the
bureaucratic process could take months, even years, before their asylum application is
granted. In the event that an asylum seeker manages to reach Europe, certain right-wing
governments, such as Hungary, stand as an intimidating obstacle between themselves and
EU countries like Germany and Sweden that are willing to grant asylum.
By simply not having required documentation, refugees en route to the EU are
treated as inferior criminals because they cross "irregularly" and are therefore deemed as
"illegal migrants," in direct contradiction of the principles and rights outlined in the
Convention and Protocol on Refugee Status. These labels serve as a rationale for ultranationalist governments to not only deny refugees protection but also to resort to
aggressive tactics to repel them away. Arendt's “We Refugees” was written over 70 years
ago, but her criticisms of how refugees are treated still very much applies to the
indifference towards refugees in Europe today. The international community may have
expanded on refugee’s legal rights since Arendt’s time, but the reality for many on the
ground remains largely unchanged.
4.0 Data Analysis
Defying the Dublin Regulation
The Dublin Regulation creates a structure of criteria for identifying the Member
State responsible for the examination of an asylum claim in Europe. This policy requires
asylum seekers to be processed in the first EU country in which they initially arrived. The
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purpose of this regulation is to aid in the efficiency of determining refugee status, to
prevent asylum seekers from filing for asylum in multiple EU states and also to promote
better monitoring mechanisms. The problem with this rule, however, is that the majority
of asylum seekers that use the central Mediterranean route are continuing to arrive within
Europe’s southern periphery. Countries such as Italy and Greece are adversely affected
by this rule because it imposes disproportionate responsibilities when compared to other
EU member states, notably wealthier northern European states that have a greater
capacity to accommodate large numbers of refugees.
Many refugees arriving in Europe’s southern periphery choose to continue
northward on their journey, coming directly at odds with the Dublin Regulation. They
seek a life in more economically stable European countries that puts them in the ideal
position to get back on their feet. In doing so, they refuse to get processed in the country
they arrive in. Federico Fossi, spokesman of the UNHCR in Rome, argues that
Up until last year, it looked like just an Italian thing. The debate was why Italy,
being the external border of the EU, should be left alone in dealing with this?
There is a cost involved and we need help to process all these people. In 2014,
people started to refuse being finger printed in big groups, Syrians and Eritreans,
because they didn’t want to stay in Italy and if you are finger printed according to
[the] Dublin Regulation, you have to apply for asylum in that country whereas, if
you avoid being fingerprinted you can go to another country and you can ask for
protection there. So that created some problems other European countries were
accusing Italy of doing it on purpose, its like closing one eye and letting them go.
(Interview with Federico Fossi, Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015)
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This process has contributed to the wave of migration that is proliferating into all parts of
Europe today. There is simply no incentive for entry states like Greece and Italy, who
face an array of economic problems of their own, to comply with the Dublin Regulation
and enforce refugees to stay when they do not want to.
In August 2015, Germany announced that it was discontinuing the application of
the Dublin Regulation for Syrian asylum seekers, which effectively stopped deportations
of Syrians back to their European country of entry. “Let's be frank. The Dublin process,
in its current form, is obsolete,” proclaimed German Chancellor, Angela Merkel in a
passionate speech made to the European Parliament in October 2015 (Al-Jazeera.com,
“EU asylum rules rendered ‘obsolete’”). The German government estimated that the
country would accept 800,000 refugees before 2016. This move was viewed as a critical
act of solidarity with entry-point states. When the economic and political leader of the
EU decides that it has to suspend the Dublin Regulation for the purpose of providing
asylum and safeguarding the solidarity of the EU, it is a clear indication that the Dublin
Regulation is not only ineffective, but also counter-productive to its very mandate.
Hence, refugees are not abiding by the Dublin Regulation and continuing north
without being processed, entry states are failing to enforce the measures, and wealthier
states such as Germany are directly suspending the regulation. The actions and
sentiments of member states, refugees, and the non-governmental agencies that support
them indicates one clear message - the Dublin Regulation needs to be amended or
replaced.
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Inefficiency and Ineffectiveness in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)
Adan is a refugee I interviewed at the Joel Nafuma Refugee Center (JNRC) in
Rome about his reception in Europe on September 7th 2015. He explained that he fled the
civil war in Mali by taking a boat across the Central Mediterranean. Upon arriving in
Malta in 2012, he made a fake document that allowed him to take a plane straight to
Rome. He was able to do this because Maltese authorities did not notice his arrival,
subsequently bypassing all EU safeguards for asylum seekers. When he arrived at the
Termini train station in Rome, he stumbled upon several other refugees gathered in what
appeared to be a makeshift camp and asked them how he could seek asylum; they guided
him to the police station. The police station would process Adan under the Dublin System
through the European Dactyloscopy, the European fingerprint database used for
identifying asylum seekers and irregular migrants (something that should have been done
in Malta according to official procedures). Adan immediately experienced the
bureaucratic delays of the EU asylum system. “When I got to the police station, there
were already several refugees. The police only accepted ten a day. On the sixth day I
finally got in and they took my fingerprints and photo for identification.” But even after
being processed, Adan was still left on his own: “I was homeless for five months before I
even got housing. I spent my nights in between a parking lot near the Coliseum, refugee
assistance centers and the Termini station."
Adan’s story indicates that there is a clear disparity between a refugee’s legal
rights in Europe and the unfortunate realities. Many of the directives that make up the
CEAS were not observed and subsequently failed to properly accommodate Adan,
starting with his initial arrival in Malta. For example, the Dublin Regulation was not
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applied because Malta (the first country entered) did not process his asylum application;
instead, the paperwork was completed in Italy. Since the Dublin Regulation was not in
effect, Adan effortlessly sidestepped the entire system by using the fake travel documents
that got him to Italy. This indicates that refugees are not only victims of the system, but
also actively capitalizing on its failures. Second, the Receptions Directive failed to
establish humane reception conditions for Adan as he waited on a decision to be made on
his asylum application.
Under this directive, Adan was guaranteed material support such as food, housing,
and healthcare to ensure an adequate standard of living while his application was
pending. Yet, at a time when he needed support the most following his dreadful journey
across the Mediterranean - he was left homeless and unable to work for five months.
Third, under the Qualification Directive, Italy failed to efficiently determine whether or
not Adan was qualified for international protection. Adan was fleeing civil war in his
home country and therefore had a strong claim to refugee status under the 1951 Refugee
Convention. Nevertheless, it still took over five months before his application was finally
approved. Lastly, when Adan arrived in Malta, he was unaccounted for due to the
country’s lack of border assessment mechanisms. Because of this, he was not granted
access to the legal aid and interpretation services that are guaranteed under the Asylum
Procedures Directive. If adequate asylum infrastructure were in place, Adan would have
had his asylum application processed upon arrival limiting his ability to skirt the system.
Adan’s case may be just one specific example, but it highlights the inability of the
CEAS to provide a fair and efficient asylum procedure several years prior, before the EU
began to witness the record influx of refugees entering its borders in 2015. Adan’s
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experience three years ago puts into perspective the incredible hardships for the
thousands of refugees arriving at Europe’s borders, and the lack of preparation for the EU
to accommodate them.
Dangerous Smuggler Networks: Devastating Impacts & Root Causes
Exploiting Refugees
In 2014, a total of 3,279 refugees died on their journey to Europe - 2,447 of those
died on the central Mediterranean route. This route, mainly facilitated by smugglers in
Libya, capitalizes on the country’s lack of governance and refugees’ desperation to seek
asylum. Thousands of people from Syria and other parts of Africa flock to Libya as a
transit point to Europe, where smugglers charge anywhere from $1,000 to $3,000 per
passenger (Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015). To
make as much money per trip as possible, smugglers overcrowd refugees on unseaworthy
vessels that often times capsize mid journey - such as the April 2015 shipwreck off the
coast of Lampedusa that killed over 800 people (UNHCR, “UNHCR welcomes EU
Mediterranean plans, but says more needs to be done”, Apr. 2015).
These refugees flee through Libya to escape the physical and mental trauma
inflicted on them in their home countries. But often times, their experiences with
smugglers only make matters worse. Many refugees that make it to Libya have already
endured a long journey through the Saharan desert. Once in Libya, they are rounded up in
warehouses where they may be subjected to torture, sexual violence and inhumane
conditions by their smugglers before making their perilous journey across the
Mediterranean (Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September
2015).
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I asked Flavio Di Giacomo, spokesperson for the IOM in Italy, to elaborate on the
deplorable conditions for migrants in Libya, He explains:
The smugglers are becoming increasingly violent. In 2007-2008, there were a lot
of Eritrean women who arrived pregnant because they were raped. Usually when
a migrant pays for their trip, they are gathered in small warehouses in Libya, with
100-150 people with just one toilet for example. We know that at night,
smugglers go in there and rape women in front of children. They beat the men,
and ask for more money. We spoke to one man who was forced to drink dirty
water. So the conditions are terrible there. (Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo,
IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015)
Unfortunately, the situation does not get any better once migrants board their
boats. Many interviews revealed that refugees are positioned according to their ethnicity
and/or how much they are able to pay. According to Federico Fossi, those who pay the
most money are at the top with life jackets, and those who pay the least are overcrowded
in the hull of the boat where they are most vulnerable. Rescuers frequently recover bodies
that died of asphyxiation. Di Giacomo of the IOM reported a similar account explaining
that
Western Saharan Africans are forced to stay in the hull of the boat, which is the
most dangerous part. There are 100-200 people in there with just one small
window to exit. It’s a trap actually - many times people die from the fumes of the
engine and if there is a wreck, they’re the first to die because they drown… The
migrants are provided with extremely worthless vessels. There are two kinds of
vessels. One is old fishing boats, which are very old and unsafe and could never
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make a trip all the way to Italy. There are also rubber dinghies, which are being
used a lot right now. They are inflated at the beach, filled up with migrants, up to
140 people on one boat. The quality is so bad that when it’s too hot it starts to
deflate (Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015).
Piero Ritjano, director of the Joel Nafuma Refugee Center (JNRC), added that
that the smugglers have created “a first and second class system.” According to Piero,
refugees who complained of the conditions were often times beaten or killed by the
smuggler hosting the boat (Interview with Piero Ritjano, Joel Nafuma Refugee Center,
Rome, Italy, 4 September 2015). What these accounts uncover is that even if a vessel
successfully makes its way onto European shores, many migrants forced to travel in the
ship’s hull all too often lose their lives because there is simply not enough air. The
smugglers have created a de facto social class system, re-inscribing global systems of
power on refugee bodies and experiences, particularly along lines of race and class.
Even in the best-case scenario where a search and rescue ship spots migrants midjourney, the situation can turn deadly in a matter of seconds. “When people on boats in
distress see that a rescue boat is approaching they start to panic, they move to one side of
the boat, and the boat capsizes. It sinks very rapidly and those trapped in the hull lose
their lives” explains UNHCR’S Federico Fossi (Interview with Federico Fossi, Rome,
Italy, 8 September 2015). Tragically, even rescue operations may result in loss of life due
to fear of apprehension by the authorities.
Mental Trauma Associated with Smuggling
For those that make it to shore physically unharmed, the mental trauma can
remain. An interview conducted with Omar (Joel Nafuma Refugee Center, Rome, Italy)
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revealed just that. Like Adan, Omar was smuggled across the Central Mediterranean to
escape civil war in Mali. Omar initially agreed to meet with me to discuss his experience
with smugglers and the factors that pushed him into Europe. However, it was evident
from the start of the interview that his journey was incredibly traumatizing. It was
difficult for him to simply recall the details. Staring at the floor, avoiding all eye contact,
Omar explains regretfully:
Look, I’ve spoken to so many people from all across the states. At first, I wanted
to tell my story. I wanted to let everyone know. But for me, it’s not easy revisiting
the past, talking about my journey to Europe brings painful memories. It came to
the point where I decided that I had to worry about myself, my mental health. I
can't keep reliving my journey…I am sorry but I can’t continue speaking about it.
He made it clear that it wasn’t that he didn’t want to continue with the interview but
rather that his mental distress stifled him.
Yet despite the fact that Omar was unable to provide specific details of his
journey, it was his very inability to do so that spoke volumes. His interview brought to
light the psychological distress associated with human smuggling. In just my short time
with Omar, I realized that he displayed the typical symptoms of someone with Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder - severe emotional distress, avoidance of the account and
sudden changes in emotion/behavior (WebMD, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder –
Symptoms”) Omar’s interview raises a critical question: How many refugees that are
successfully smuggled into Europe go undiagnosed with mental illnesses? After all,
refugees have by definition experienced traumatic events in their home country - this is
what drives them out. The perilous journey in the hands of criminals only adds to that
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trauma. The CEAS should ensure that all member states comply with the Receptions
Directive, which guarantees access to mental health care for all asylum seekers entering
Europe. This would prove advantageous for both refugees and European governments.
By receiving a mental health evaluation, refugees will become aware of the pain they’re
suffering and can be treated accordingly. As a result, member states would be able to
integrate these refugees into their own societies more effectively.
Smugglers: An Indirect Consequence of CEAS
Every single person I interviewed during my research in Rome, whether from the
UN, IOM, or refugee assistance centers, all indicated that these smugglers wouldn’t exist
if better legal channels for asylum existed. It was without question, one of the main
themes throughout all my conversations in Rome.
“They should have a legal way to get protection into [sic] the EU but it’s not the
case. So what do they have to do? Go in illegally, risking their life, paying the traffickers,
and then eventually the EU will give them protection” argues Federico Fossi, of the
UNHCR (Interview with Federico Fossi, Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015). The frustration
and shame expressed by people working on the front lines to alleviate this crisis was
strongly felt.
The smuggler industry is perhaps the only element of the refugee crisis that serves
as both a pull and a push factor. One could a make a strong case that the European
Common Asylum System and its inability to provide practical means of entry for
refugees has indirectly fueled the smuggler industry. The CEAS fails to specifically
address how a refugee can legally enter the EU safely without the use of people
smugglers. Add that to the fact that visas have become increasingly difficult to obtain for
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people living in war torn countries, so that those fleeing for their lives feel they are left
with no other option. Despite calls by European leaders to target these smugglers
militarily, the more appropriate and seemingly pragmatic response would be through a
political solution. Chiara Perri, Program Director of Jesuit Refugee Services in Rome
argues,
The weakness of the European system is that all this legislation starts the moment
a refugee is on European territory. There is nothing specific about how a refugee
can access the territory of asylum. The creation of safe channels into Europe is
something that was left out of European legislation, it doesn’t touch this issue at
all and now of course this is the main gap. (Interview with Chiara Perri, Jesuit
Refugee Services in Rome, Italy, 4 September 2015)
The basic principle of supply and demand teaches us that businesses prosper when
they provide a much-needed service that was once not widely available. In this case,
smugglers exploit the gap that the CEAS has created and are providing the only
alternative for refugees to reach Europe. The EU must dramatically revise its policies in a
way that provides quick and safe legal means of protection for those seeking it. In order
to effectively prevent the smuggler industry from exacerbating the humanitarian crisis,
the EU must expand and strengthen legal migration and asylum channels. By doing so,
the middle-men (smugglers) could be put out of business. Until then, the smuggler
industry will continue to profit off the failures of EU legislation at the expense of
thousands of innocent refugees.
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Syrian Refugees: Influencing Migration Shifts
In 2014, the most popular route into Europe for refugees was through the central
Mediterranean. Consider the fact that 87,915 refugees arrived in Italy from January-July
of 2014 - by far the most arrivals of any European country. During that same time period
in 2015, however, 93,542 arrived, an 8% increase from the previous year. Yet despite this
increase, Italy was no longer the highest recipient of refugees. In Greece, the situation
had escalated dramatically, witnessing a staggering 750% surge in arrivals from January July 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. In July of 2015 alone, the UNHCR
reported that 50,242 people, mostly Syrians, arrived in Greece compared to 43,500 for
the whole of 2014. This dramatic increase undoubtedly made the eastern Mediterranean
route the most commonly used compared to the central Mediterranean in 2014 (UNHCR
Operational Update, July 21- Aug 21, 2015).
Most notably, 66% of refugees arriving in Greece from January to mid-August,
2015 were from Syria. In Italy, the number of Syrian refugees arriving from January to
July 2015 compared to the same time period the year prior decreased by 66%. “Flows are
changing” argues Federico Soda, Director of the IOM Coordinating Office for the
Mediterranean in Rome in reference to refugees arriving in Italy (IOM, “Mediterranean
Migrant Arrivals Approach 250,000”). “Some nationalities are increasing compared to
last year. This is the case with Somalis (from 3,190 to 7,538), Sudanese (from 1,301 to
5,658) and Nigerians (from 4,702 to 11,899.) Others, like the Syrians, are decreasing.”
The Syrian war has undoubtedly produced the majority of new refugees in the past five
years. As demonstrated, the Syrian migration route dictates where the influx is the
strongest.
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In order to effectively comprehend why the majority of refugees are now opting
for the eastern Mediterranean route, one must consider two main factors; Turkey’s
proximity to Greece and its multiplying Syrian refugee population. At its closest point,
Turkey is less than 1.7 km away from the Greek island of Samos. According to Samos’
mayor, Michaelis Angelopoulos, the island receives an average of 800 refugees a day
(Scheven, “Refugee Crisis: On a Greek Island, Two Worlds Meet”). Kos, Greece, part of
the Dodecanese island chain, is less than four kilometers from the coast of Bodrum,
Turkey and received 34,500 refugees from January to July of 2015. Lesbos, Greece, an
island less than 34km from Dikili, Turkey received a staggering 61,636 refugees, the
highest number during that same time period (BBC, “Migrant crisis: Greek ship at Kos to
house refugees”). Unsurprisingly, two of the top Google searches in Syria are "sea
separating Turkey and Greece" and "Greece map." Additionally, Turkey houses 1.9
million Syrian refugees - more than any other country in the world.
“It’s not very difficult to understand why there has been a huge flow of people arriving
from Turkey to Greece” says Flavio. “There are a lot of people who don’t want to go to
the refugee camps, the majority of them just left Syria and want to go straight to
Germany, Sweden or Norway.” (Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8
September 2015)
This drive could explain why so many up until 2015 were using the central
Mediterranean route - as Germany lies just north of Italy. Di Giacomo added that last
year, many Syrians who could afford a ticket were simply flying to a country close
enough for them to reach Europe that didn’t require a visa. Sudan is the only country in
the MENA region, other than Turkey, that doesn’t require Syrians to have a visa.
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Naturally, it became a prime transit point to fly in to where they could continue towards
the Libyan coast. “It is a very long, expensive, and dangerous journey” argues Di
Giacomo, adding that
There are three main causes behind the arrival of people in Greece. First, the
Greek route is safer than the Libyan route, the second reason is that they realized
it was no longer possible to take cargo ships into Italy, and the third and most
important reason is that the situation in Syria has worsened. (Interview with
Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015)
As the civil war in Syria enters its fifth year, the number of displaced people will
inevitably continue to rise. Before the war, Syria had a population of over 22 million
people. Today, that population has declined significantly as over four million refugees
have fled to neighboring countries (HRW, “Total number of Syrian refugees exceeds four
million for first time”) where they lack the right to work, and live below the poverty line.
In many cases, Syrians receive little to no assistance outside of international
organizations like the UNHCR. “The worsening conditions in Lebanon and Jordan and
restrictions on the Syrians are contributing to a sense of hopelessness,” says Ariane
Rummery of the UNHCR (The Economist, “Time to Go”). That hopelessness is fueling
the ever-rising flow of refugees through Greek’s border from Turkey.
More people are giving up on the prospect of a future in their country, causing
many to head straight towards the path to Europe - either directly from Syria or its
neighboring countries. Syrians are forced into a situation where they must decide
between two options: indefinitely live in deplorable conditions or continue their perilous
journey to Europe in hope of a better life. For a growing number of Syrians, the latter is
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becoming a more attractive option. Nearly 40% of the half a million refugees that entered
Europe from January-September 2015 are Syrian. Despite these numbers, the vast
majority of Syrians are still in their country or its neighbors meaning this could be only
the beginning of the refugee movement. All the elements in place have created a perfect
storm brewing in the eastern Mediterranean. A long-term phenomenon is now underway,
in which a constant flow of irregular migration stems from Turkey, flooding into Europe
with little to no signs of slowing down in the near future.
Demographic Factors
The Case of Germany: Altruism in the National Interest
While the unprecedented influx of refugees in the EU has incited the majority of
member states to scramble on how to “share the burden,” some view this problem as a
resource rather than a burden at all. Germany, the EU’s political and economic leader,
has taken the lead on this issue and announced that it will absorb over 800,000 refugees
by the end of 2015 (Zakaria, “Germany's road to redemption”). Germany’s policy is not
only an act of altruism but also in the national interest. Germany has the lowest birthrate
in the world, with only 8.2 babies born each year per 1,000 people (Shubert, “How
Germany rose to the occasion”). With few citizens born each year, its population will
become increasingly older, and as a result, a smaller proportion of working-age residents
(aged between 20-65) will be able to contribute to Germany’s economy and its generous
social security program. In fact, according to Henning Voepel, Director of the Hamburg
Institute of International Economics (HWWI), Germany’s working age population is
expected to decline from 61% to 54% by 2030 (BBC, “Germany passes Japan to have
world's lowest birth rate”). With nearly half of Germany expected to retire in only 15
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years, young immigrants will be essential in filling the labor gap. Flavio Di Giacomo,
spokesperson of the IOM, argues,
Migration is something that must be handled with long-term policies. Usually
some European governments, such as Italy and others just think for the next three
months. What Germany is doing right now is planning for the next ten years.
(Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015)
Germany’s total population is expected to decrease to 13 million by 2050, while
life expectancy is rising, to 84 years of age for women and 88 for men (PEW “Attitudes
About Aging”, Jan.2014). If Germany wants to sustain its economic power, the country
will need to replenish its shrinking labor force - and quick. The nearly one million
refugees seeking asylum in Germany are perceived by the German state as skilled,
hungry for work and ready to contribute (Bello, Copley, “In aging Germany, refugees
seen as tomorrow's skilled workers”).
In essence, Germany is in an advantageous position. By absorbing large amounts
of refugees, they are not only alleviating Europe’s refugee crisis but also its own crisis at
home - an aging and dwindling population. At the same time, Germany increases its
political capital, reaping the benefits of being a model nation that rose to the occasion
during a global crisis.
A Resource, Not A Burden
Germany’s low birth rate is not an anomaly in Europe; it is only one example of
the continent’s overall demographic problem. Demographic trends for countries across
Europe show a steady rise in age and decline in population growth. One way to measure
demographic trends is by birthrate (as noted in the previous section) but another

	
  

57
measurement is the replacement fertility rate. The replacement fertility rate of 2.1 is the
average number of births per woman that will maintain a country’s current population
level. Anything below this number will result in population loss. Low birth rates are
endemic across Europe. Some examples include Italy at 1.39, Spain at 1.27, Portugal at
1.21, and Germany at 1.4- well below the rate needed to reproduce current population
levels. In fact, there isn’t a single country in the EU that has a fertility rate at or above
2.1. “If Europe wants to survive, it needs migration” argues Di Giacomo of the IOM
(Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015). He adds to the
notion that Europe’s demography will directly influence its economic health. “Generally
speaking, even without the refugee crisis, just talking about demography, in Europe, in
the next 30 years there will be 25% less people of working age. In Africa, people of
working age will be three times more than it is now, from 400 million to 1.2 billion”
(Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy, 8 September 2015) adding that
Africa will not have enough jobs available to accommodate its rapid population growth.
At the same time, he points out that as Europe ages, it will need migration from the
Global South if it wants to survive (Interview with Flavio Di Giacomo, IOM Rome, Italy,
8 September 2015).
Those who continue to oppose migration in Europe, such as the Golden Dawn
party in Greece, need a public enemy to scapegoat for their country’s problems. When
living in a continent that is mostly socialist it is perhaps all too easy to fall into the
narrative that refugees arriving on “our borders” are “lazy” freeloaders that must go. Such
is the stance of Polish Parliament Member, Korwin Mikke, who referred to refugees in
his country as “human trash unwilling work” (Michail Bialkovicz, “Polish MEP calls
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refugees human trash”, YouTube). However, several studies have proven these
sentiments to be nothing short of baseless bigotry.
For example, research conducted by four economists at the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER, 2014) concluded that immigration benefited local
populations in 19 of the 20 industrialized countries they studied (NBER, “A Quantitative
Assessment of Native Welfare”). Another study at NBER in Denmark revealed that a rise
in refugees in Denmark “pushed less educated native workers (especially the young and
low-tenured ones) to pursue less manual-intensive occupations,” (Foged, Peri, 2013:
abstract page) effectively raising the class status of native-born citizens. Consequently,
immigration in Denmark had “positive effects on native unskilled wages, employment
and occupational mobility” (Foged, Peri, 2013: abstract page). Surprisingly, Denmark has
been one of the least welcoming countries for refugees in Europe.
These numbers indicate a clear message: migration in Europe can serve as an
essential resource, not a burden. Fortunately, countries like Germany have started to
realize this. But other countries, particularly those run by national conservative leaders
like Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban and Denmark’s Lars Lokke Rasmussen
continue to take a hardline on immigration. The irony is that EU leaders who oppose
migration defend their stance by claiming that they are protecting the economy, stability,
and the very identity of Europe. The demographic trends, however, clearly indicate that
without migration, these same areas are put in jeopardy. In order to preserve European
prosperity, a change of perception is needed; accommodating migrants shouldn’t be seen
strictly in the lens of humanitarianism, but rather a tool for economic survival.
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5.0 Conclusion
“It is Europe today that represents a beacon of hope, a haven of stability in the eyes of
women and men in the Middle East and in Africa. That is something to be proud of and
not something to fear.”- Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, 9
September 2015
Findings
This thesis investigated the implications that EU asylum policies and rising
nationalism have had on the refugee crisis in Europe. I argued that these two factors not
only inhibited the EU’s ability to collectively address the influx of refugees but also
created tensions between the EU and its member states, threatening the very values that
keep the EU intact. I supported my argument by analyzing the qualitative/quantitative
data that I gathered from my fieldwork in Europe, as well as a review of relevant
literature. The literature examined theories such as Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”
and Agamben’s “State of Exception” to explain the interaction between Europe and the
arrival of non-European refugees. The goal of this thesis was to assess shared conceptions
of the EU and how those formations influenced European responses to refugee influxes.
I first demonstrated the inadequacies of EU refugee policies by analyzing its
response to the rising death toll in the Mediterranean Sea. The EU’s decision to replace
Italy’s Mare Nostrum with the Triton mission was a step in the wrong direction, and
exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. Triton was inferior to Italy’s Mare Nostrum because
it 1.) Allocated fewer assets 2.) Covered a smaller operational area, and 3.) Focused on
border control rather than search and rescue. These setbacks, as highlighted in my
research, served as a causative factor for the rise in deaths in the central Mediterranean,
including the April 2015 disaster, which killed over 800 refugees. It is no coincidence
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that a spike in disasters occurred immediately following the decision for Triton to replace
Mare Nostrum. These deaths were a by-product of Europe’s decision to concentrate its
efforts on border protection rather than life-saving operations. Although Triton eventually
expanded its mandate, it doesn’t take away from the damage already done as a result of
its costly decisions.
This paper also focused on the efficacy of the CEAS and its implementation
amongst EU member states. I argued that the CEAS exacerbated the refugee crisis
because it fails to address legal channels for refugees outside of Europe to seek asylum,
leading to exploitation by violent smuggler networks who fill in that gap. To support this
claim, I provided a critical analysis of the CEAS, its interaction with my human subjects
(Adan and Omar), and excerpts from interviews I conducted with various human rights
experts in Italy. The interviewees unanimously criticized the lack of such legal channels
within the CEAS, and how it has indirectly fueled smuggler networks, particularly in
Turkey and Libya.
Europe would not be in much of a crisis if the CEAS addressed non-European
refugees. The EU’s inability to rely on the CEAS during the unprecedented influx has led
member states to respond in a divided and ad-hoc fashion. I demonstrated two contrasting
examples of this phenomenon, using both Hungary and Germany as cases where member
states both suspended a key policy in the CEAS, the Dublin Regulation. The difference is
that Hungary did so to aggressively crack down on migration while Germany did so in
order to open its borders to nearly a million displaced Syrians. These examples clearly
indicate the CEAS’s failure to achieve what it intended, forming a united European
response towards asylum seekers. Retrospectively, my research and findings confirm my
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original argument regarding EU asylum policy in many ways; it is broken, counterproductive and indeed harmful to the very integrity of the EU.
It would not be justified to blame the entirety of Europe’s refugee crisis on
existing EU policies. After all, Europe remains the preferred destination for thousands of
refugees and the refugee crisis has been the epicenter of EU summits for at least the past
year. The good news is that EU member states agree in acknowledging the failures of the
current EU asylum system and that revisions are desperately needed. The bad news is that
they are divided in their approach. As this paper demonstrates, some states are acting in
line with the EU’s values of humanitarianism and actively searching for solutions to
properly accommodate refugees in Europe. At the same time, for many other member
states, nationalism has trumped European solidarity; preventing the EU from revising its
failed refugee policy and forming a comprehensive response to the unprecedented
number of refugees arriving in Europe. This paper examined how historical undertones
and the paranoid preservation of cultural identity amongst relatively homogenous
European societies played a role in influencing xenophobic and nationalistic responses by
some European governments. The reemergence of nationalism amid the arrival of
thousands of refugees not only clouds Europe’s moral compass, but also weakens the EU
and its founding principles.
My findings also highlighted the irony of Europe treating refugees as a burden,
when in reality they could serve as an essential economic resource. To prove this, I
examined the EU’s aging and declining demographic trend, which will inevitably lead to
a shrinking workforce. I argued that incoming refugees (the majority of whom are of
working age) could fill this much-needed gap and enhance Europe’s economy by
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contributing to the generous welfare system, rather than exploit it (as several right-wing
European politicians suggest). My interview with the IOM’s spokesman, Flavio Di
Giacomo further supported this claim, arguing that the stability of Europe’s economy is
contingent on migrant labor. His sentiments were coupled with references from studies
conducted by the economic think tank, National Bureau of Economic Research, which
showed how immigration benefited the economies of industrialized countries. The
implication is that the influx of refugees into Europe doesn’t have to be a problem; it can
serve as a solution. Economic incentives were the driving forces that first united Europe,
via the European Coal and Steel Community (the EU’s precursor), following World War
Two. There is no reason why this can’t happen.
A Reflection: Acts of Terrorism in Paris
The ISIS-sanctioned attacks in Paris that killed 130 civilians on November 13,
2015 were barbaric, senseless, and an attack on humanity. Any progress made in support
of human rights and openness towards refugees fleeing the Middle East were now under
threat. Disturbingly, the tragedy immediately became a political tool used by several
aforementioned anti-immigration and anti-Islam right wing nationalist parties across
Europe to gain power, undermine EU refugee policy and close its borders to refugees.
Just days following the tragedy, these parties left no time linking increased Muslim
migration to terrorism. The Islamophobic reaction in Europe following the attacks is
eerily reminiscent of the “Orientalism” Edward Said warned us about (see p.31). These
types of reactions are counter-productive. ISIS wants nothing more but to materialize
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” (see p.27) by forging an "Islam versus the West"
narrative. Nationalists who choose to demonize Muslims and propose that Europe close
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its borders to refugees are feeding into ISIS’ narrative thus fueling the group’s
propaganda aimed at radicalizing marginalized Sunni Muslims around the world. It
should be noted; religious extremists who act in complete contradiction to the very faith
they claim carried out these foolish acts. After all, many Muslim refugees are fleeing the
very same forces behind the Paris attacks - escaping terrorism, not creating it. Europe
should not succumb to the reaction ISIS so desperately seeks. Europe’s greatest weapon
will be in its ability to provide refuge to those who desperately seek it, regardless of their
religion. A collectively hospitable EU response to the crisis, now more than ever, will
speak volumes. This is a moment for the EU to reaffirm itself and fearlessly display its
strong commitment to its humanitarian values.
Conclusion
In many ways, the EU’s very existence is a symbol of political expansion and
inventiveness. A democratic union of nations that was able to come together in solidarity
on behalf of lasting peace despite its historical divisions. Who would have thought, that
after all the atrocities committed in Europe during World Wars One and Two, the
continent would be united politically with Germany as its de facto leader? The EU is
proof that people can learn from their mistakes, look past their cultural differences and
unite as one for the purpose of promoting liberal values, peace, and stability.
Unfortunately, the divisive response to the refugee crisis has threatened to unravel
decades of progress made in Europe. Nationalism can be toxic, especially to the EU
experiment that relies so heavily on its official motto: “United in diversity.” In fact, it
was nationalism and xenophobia that fueled much of Europe’s destruction less than a
century ago. The continent has gone to great extents to tear down the walls and fences of
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national borders that divided much of Europe. European prosperity only grew once those
borders were eradicated. Contrary to the rhetoric of some nationalists, history and data
both support the notion that it is nationalism that threatens Europe, not immigration.
The refugee crisis now has Europe at a crossroads between continuing its upward
trajectory of political evolution or reverting to its destructive ways. As Jean-Claude
Juncker’s quote indicates, this is a defining moment for the EU. If Europe can come
together, and truly abide by the values it was founded on then it can once again set the
standard for human rights and further strengthen its Union. We must remember; it was
Europe that was once a continent of refugees escaping political persecution. It was
Europe that persevered and became a land of tolerance and liberty. For these reasons,
Europe is well equipped to assist the world’s most vulnerable people, setting an example
for the international community. Perhaps nationalists are right in a way; these refugees
will change Europe forever. However, it is Europe’s response that will determine how
this change will transpire.
Proposed Solutions & Recommendations
The only way for Europe to effectively approach this crisis is to target the source.
Although Europe cannot single-handedly solve or prevent the push factors causing these
refugees to flee, it can change the way these refugees are arriving. As my research
suggests, the CEAS was not designed with non-European refugees in mind. There are
simply not enough safe and legal channels for those seeking international protection from
outside of Europe to enter legally. Refugees shouldn’t have to rely on violent smugglers
and risk their lives to make it to Europe. If the EU developed a pragmatic approach that
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allowed refugees seeking asylum to enter Europe legally, the humanitarian disaster could
be quelled and a safe and organized migration flow could be facilitated into Europe.
Complete Abolishment of the Dublin Regulation
Considering that my research has reaffirmed my belief that EU asylum policy has
played a major role in worsening the refugee crisis, I believe a complete revision of the
CEAS is essential. The Dublin Regulation mandates that refugees file for asylum in the
first EU country they entered, and its application has proven to be problematic for both
the host state and the refugees. As highlighted in this paper, member states that serve as
the EU’s external border have faced a disproportionate responsibility compared to
northern states. Countries like Greece and Italy have been systematically left to deal with
the influx on their own which has caused inhumane reception conditions for refugees
(effectively violating the Receptions Directive of the CEAS). In essence, the Dublin
Regulation makes it difficult for the rest of the CEAS to work. As previously mentioned,
member states such as Germany have begun to suspend the Dublin Regulation. The
directive has lost credibility amongst member states and serves a main source of
contention. In order to make its asylum regime more effective, the EU must completely
abolish the Dublin Regulation.
State Compliance Mechanisms
The efficacy of the CEAS relies on the willingness of member states to implement
its policies. My data indicated that there is an uneven implementation of the CEAS across
the EU. Once a revised and unified European asylum regime is realized, there must be a
state compliance mechanism that specifically ensures that all member states are carrying
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out asylum law accordingly. Member states that fail to comply should be subject to
penalty payments imposed by the European Court of Justice.
EU Processing Centers in Turkey
The influx of refugees into Europe became unmanageable once refugees in
Turkey started to smuggle themselves in large numbers to Greek islands. Turkey hosts
more Syrian refugees than any other country and also happens to be the closest link
between the war-stricken Middle East and Europe. There needs to be a presence of EU
processing centers in Turkey so refugees can apply for refugee status in the EU without
having to physically be in Europe. The UNHCR should be present at these centers to
assist with asylum applications, and ensure that the EU is following through with their
commitment to a fair review of all claims. Joint UNHCR-EU offshore processing centers
in Turkey would lessen the incentive for refugees to risk their lives across the
Mediterranean, weaken the smuggler industry, and organize a managed migration flow
into Europe.
Scholarships for Refugees
As demonstrated in the Data Analysis section of this paper, the EU is going
through a demographic crisis. The continent’s aging and dwindling population must rely
on migration to fill in the inevitable gap in labor. To help fill this gap, the EU should
expand student visas for refugees. Moreover, the EU should incentivize universities to
take in larger amounts of qualified refugees by providing them with subsidies. The
subsidies granted to European universities can help fund tuition costs, on-campus housing
and translation services for incoming refugees. Since Europe’s college age population is
expected to decrease, universities will be inclined to participate. Such a program could
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facilitate integration, cultivate refugees to become the next generation of skilled workers,
and protect the future of the European economy.
Incentivize Host States to Integrate Refugees
As discussed in this paper, one of the main causes for the influx of refugees into
Europe is due to the deteriorating conditions in formal and informal refugee camps in
host states across the Middle East and Africa. Refugees mainly rely on aid from UN
agencies, which have had to cut back on services due to lack of funding. However, these
refugees wouldn’t have to depend on international aid if they had the opportunity to
formally work and become self-sufficient. The lack of opportunities and freedoms for
refugees in host states prevents them from becoming productive members of society.
These exclusionary policies force refugees into abject poverty and isolate them from
society. The EU should provide an increase in foreign aid for neighboring host-states that
demonstrate their willingness to fully integrate refugees. If implemented correctly, many
refugees would be able to provide for themselves, effectively decelerating the refugee
flow into Europe.
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6.0 Appendices
Appendix A: Interview Guide for Organizational Representatives (Structured Interviews)
• Impacts of EU refugee policy (such as the Dublin Regulation):
How has the European asylum system impacted the crisis?
Has it helped migrants or worsened the humanitarian crisis? Has it placed an unfair
burden on Southern European states? If so, how?
What steps do refugees in Europe take to seek asylum?
How have refugees been integrated in Europe?
How do you think the refugee crisis has impacted EU politics/society?
What solutions would you propose?
• Push/Pull factors that drove these refugees out of their country (political violence, weak
governance, civil war, lack of economic opportunity, and extreme poverty):
What are the biggest push/pull factors for refugees?
How would you distinguish between a refugee and an economic migrant?
• Services: What kind of services do you provide? Do you receive EU/state funding?
How has your organization adapted to the recent influx of refugees? What are the biggest
challenges?
• Smuggler networks that may have assisted refugees on their journey to Europe: What is
the smuggler process like? How were the conditions in the boats?
How much do refugees typically pay?
What level of government assistance do these refugees receive?
Appendix B: Interview Guide for Asylum-Seekers (Unstructured Interviews)
•Push/Pull factors that drove these refugees out of their country (political violence, weak
governance, civil war, lack of economic opportunity, and extreme poverty):
Why did you flee your country? Why flee to Europe and not a neighboring country?
• Smuggler networks that may have assisted refugees on their journey to Europe:
What was your experience with the smuggling process like?
How were the conditions on the boat?
How did you arrive? Were you rescued at sea?
Did you regret your decision at any point during the smuggling process? If so, why?
• Impacts of EU refugee policy (such as the Dublin Regulation):
What was the hardest part about seeking asylum in Europe?
How do you think the EU can improve in accommodating refugees in Europe?
Please explain your first day in Europe, and experience with the CEAS. How did you
access the asylum procedure? How long did it take?
How were your living conditions? Where do you live now? Did you receive material
support (shelter/food/healthcare)?
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